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GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSUMER· 
Richard ]. Barber* 
I believe we are on the threshold of a fundamental change in our popular eco-
nomic thought, that in the future we are going to think less about the producer 
and more about the consumer.-Govemor Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 1932)1 
In Washington, consumer legislation is still a dream.-Senator Philip A. Hart 
(December 1963)2 
T HE consumer has long been a subject of political concern, yet his problems as a purchaser are now probably greater in num-
ber and more serious than ever before. The failure of public policy 
to respond adequately to consumer needs must certainly be one of 
the most perplexing chapters in any examination of our federal 
government's response to the challenges of an increasingly complex 
economy. What is particularly intriguing is that the consumer's dif-
ficulties in the marketplace have long been recognized, both by the 
public in general and by political spokesmen. Indeed, it seems that 
more ink has been spilled, more speeches delivered, and more presi-
dential and congressional documents issued on the subject of con-
sumer problems-all with less effect-than in any other area of 
public concern, except, perhaps, for issues of war and peace. 
Adam Smith, that shrewd Scot who recognized the need for gov-
ernment involvement in a private economy more often than many of 
his twentieth-century "conservative" followers like to admit, empha-
sized nearly two centuries ago that "consumption is the sole end 
and purpose of all production" and that "the interest of the producer 
ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for pro-
moting that of the consumer."3 Smith was quite right to emphasize 
• Special Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Preparation 
of this article began before the author joined the Subcommittee staff and while he 
was Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The views expressed 
are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of any member of the Sub-
committee or any other person on its staff.-Ed. 
1. THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 639, 645 (1938). 
2. Address to the Association of California Consumers Convention, Dec. 7, 1963, 
p. I (mimeo.). Speaking more recently, Senator Hart-who has become ·a hero among 
consumers because of his sponsorship of the Truth-in-Packaging Bill (see note 74 
infra)-assessed the situation again: "The fact is that Congress has [still] not passed 
one piece of legislation tailored specifically for the economic interests of consumers." 
Testimony before the Michigan House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Consumer Protection, Nov. 30, 1965, p. 2 (mimeo.). The Senate passed a Truth-in-
Packaging bill June 9; House action is still uncertain as this article goes to press. 
3. SMITH, AN lNQUmY INTO nm NATURE AND CAUSES OF nm WEALTH OF NATIONS 
625 (Modem Library ed. 1937). Smith also asserted that !'the point is so perfectly self-
evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to disprove it." Ibid. However, Smith 
recognized that consumers were not accorded equal consideration vis-a-vis producers. 
See note 58 infra. An analogy can be drawn to the elementary Keynesian point that 
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the importance of the consumer's role. In fact, consumer expendi-
tures today account for almost two thirds of the $700 billion in 
goods and services produced annually in the United States.4 Yet if 
the consumer is as important as the producer, government has been 
concerned far more with the interests of producers. Although com-
petition is essential to a free enterprise economy (disregarding 
Schumpeter, and his assumptions about the necessity of monopoly 
for technological progress5 have been seriously challenged6), the 
businessman has eagerly (and understandably, from his standpoint) 
sought to secure a monopolistic shelter from its unmitigated and 
often harsh winds. Moreover, government has done at least as much 
to help sellers gain a monopoly as it has to delimit or destroy their 
protected positions. 
As a result of the attention accorded to producers, the consumer's 
problems have been considered only erratically, haphazardly, and 
sporadically. In contrast to producers (and the Government itself), 
who are armed with information and who are otherwise able to 
make informed, rational decisions, the individual buyer, who is be-
sieged by advertising, deceived by packages, confronted with an 
expanding range of highly complex goods, limited in time, and ex-
hausted by a trek along the aisles of a supermarket, is simply not 
qualified to buy discriminately and wisely. The "art of spending 
money" remains as backward as the distinguished economist, Wes-
ley C. Mitchell, depicted it in his classic article published more than 
"effective demand" is a product of consumption and investment expenditure, with what 
is not consumed being regarded as "invested." KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936), 
4. In the fourth quarter of 1965 the country's gross national product, seasonally 
adjusted at an annual rate, totaled $695 billion. Personal consumption expenditures 
amounted to $440 billion (if interest paid by consumers were included, the figure 
would exceed $452 billion). ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 209 (table C·l), 226 
(table C-14) Gan. 1966). 
5. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942). In, Schumpcter's 
view, innovation is critical for "the competition that counts" is, "the competition from 
the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply •••• " Id. at 84. 
Schumpeter regarded monopoly as an essential precondition for innovation. 
6. Recent empirical studies tend to rebut the notion that large business firms arc 
more innovative than smaller organizations. In fact, most basic inventions made during 
this century have come from individuals or small firms. See JEWKES, THE SOURCES OF 
!NvENTION ch. IV (1958); Schmookler, Inventors Past and Present, 39 REv. EcoN. &: 
STAT. 321 (1957). One analyst concluded that "there are inherent incompatibilities 
between the large industrial laboratories and high-level invention achievement," 
Hamberg, Invention in the Industrial Research Laboratory, 71 J. PoL. EcoNOMY 95, 
115 (1963). For additional material on this subject, see Hearings on Economic Concen• 
tration Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th Cong,, 1st 
Sess., pt. 4 (1965). 
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a half century ago.7 Government, in spite of the quantitatively large 
number of steps taken with the declared objective of aiding the 
consumer, has not helped significantly to correct this imbalance 
between producers and ·consumers . 
. One major reason for the lack of positive governmental action 
in this area is that the problems of the consumer have never been 
defined in any systematic fashion and thus have not been compre-· 
hensively confronted. Consumers' problems have almost always been 
viewed on an ad hoc basis-as isolated cases to be resolved individ-
ually. Seldom have they been placed in a more general framework 
or seen as symptoms of a fundamental economic disorder that must 
itself be diagnosed and treated. 
This article takes up four major topics. First, the principal char-
acteristics of governmental action with respect to consumer protec-
tion are reviewed, :with emphasis on developments during the past 
thirty years. Second, the traditional pleas for consumer protection 
are examined with a view toward determining the inadequacies in 
governmental action. Third, the problems of the consumer are stud-
ied in the context of oligopolistic industrial markets in which non-
price competition accentuates the place of advertising and severely 
restricts the dissemination of factual information that is essential to 
enlightened purchase decisions. Fourth, the ingredients of a mean-
ingful consumer protection program are outlined and the proba-
bilities for their political implementation appraised. 
J. GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSUMER: A SURVEY OF THE EXPERIENCE 
The question of the protection of the consumers is one of pro-
tracted historical interest.8 For at least seven hundred years the hand 
of authority-church, guild, or state-has played a role in regulat-
ing the affairs of the market, often, but not always, with the aim of 
assisting the consumer. The Scholastics insisted upon a "just price." 
The Tudors took various steps in the sixteenth century to regulate 
what they regarded as improper conduct in the evolving medieval 
markets. Legislation which condemned forestalling, engrossing, and 
regrating was in part designed to protect buyers from monopolists.9 
7. Mitchell, The Backward Art of Spending Money, 2 AM. EcoN. REv. 269 (1912). 
"Important as the art of spending money is, we have developed less skill in its practice 
than in the practice of making money." Ibid. 
8. For a brief, well-written study of the historical aspects of consumer protection, 
see LEVE'IT, THE CONSUMER IN HlsTORY (1929). 
9. See Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 355 (1954). 
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In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries laws were passed to con-
trol prices which were thought to be "too high." More recently, state 
and federal antitrust laws adopted in the United States during the 
latter decades of the nineteenth century had their origin as much 
in a broad feeling of pricing abuses as in any other single factor.10 
To acknowledge past governmental efforts to deal with problems 
of consumer interest is not to indicate that those activities signifi-
cantly helped the individual buyer. Twelfth century laws banning 
engrossing and related practices protected the exclusive market 
rights granted by the Crown. Moreover, the enactment of the Stat-
ute of Monopolies in 1623 did not terminate the exclusive powers 
conferred on chartered trading companies, cities, and boroughs. 
Other laws that might appear to have aided the consumer were just 
as much designed to bolster the trade-restraining practices of the 
guilds. Thus, it can be seen that the consumer's market position re-
mained nearly as limited as ever.11 
Concern for the consumer over the centuries has not been con-
fined to prices and the price mechanism. At least as early as the :fif-
teenth century, authoritative proclamations were issued that closely 
regulated the content and quality of food products. For example, 
in 1450 the Munich Brewers Guild specified the contents for beer.12 
Similarly, weights and measures have been controlled for hundreds 
of years, and it is interesting to note that this is the subject of one 
of the few specific provisions in the United States Constitution that 
is of immediate concern to citizens in their role as consumers.18 Even 
the conditions of retail trade have long been subject to governmen-
tal control, as indicated by an early English decree which forbade 
merchants "to set up red or black cloths or shields whereby the eyes 
of the buyers were deceived in the choice of a good cloth."14 More-
over, governments have always been concerned with fraud and 
deceit. 
10. For a general review of state regulatory efforts, particularly during the past 
century, see Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition (pts. 
1-4), 35 YALE L.J. 905 (1926), 36 id. 42, 207, 351 (1927). The considerable distaste for 
business trusts among buyers who felt they were being exploited was a significant 
factor, and perhaps the major consideration, leading to the passage of state and federal 
antitrust laws during the late nineteenth century. See Letwin, Congress and tlle 
Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956). This sentiment-a 
form of consumer discontent-ran especially strong in the farm community. See HICKS, 
THE POPULIST REVOLT (1931). 
11. See Letwin, note 9 supra. 
12. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1965, § 1, p. 13, col. 1 (city ed.). 
13. "The Congress shall have the power to ••. fix the standard of weights and 
measures." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
14. 1 BLAND, BROWN &: TAWNEY, ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY 155 (1920). 
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A. The Consumer's Need for Information 
While extensive government intervention in the economy, partly 
designed to aid the consumer, has been apparent for about seven 
centuries, the caveat emptor philosophy has dominated both the leg-
islatures and the courts since the nineteenth century.15 The ascen-
dance of this philosophy should not be regarded as an indication 
that public authority has shown no real concern for consumer prob-
lems in this period; it has, however, helped create a widening gulf 
between the realities of the contemporary retail market and judicial 
and legislative action. The changing character of retail markets, 
both in terms of the range and type of products available for sale 
and the conditions of trade, has generated new problems for the 
individual consumer, to which government has only tardily and 
haphazardly responded. 
Even though the caveat emptor doctrine has recently become less 
rigid, existing consumer policy fails to meet the central issues pre-
sented by the marketplace of the 1960's. The law of fraud and mis-
representation is a good example. Courts and legislatures have grad-
ually expanded their definition of fraud to include statements or 
representations that, although literally true in themselves, are mis-
leading due to the failure to state additional relevant facts. This 
approach has helped curtail some advertising abuses. For examp~e, 
in 1965 the Supreme Court upheld a Federal Trade Commission de-
cision that an advertisement which purported to offer two cans of 
paint for the price of one ("buy one, get one free"-"every second 
can free") was unfair and deceptive when the product had never 
been sold at the stated single-can price.16 While recent enlargements 
of the fraud doctrine have helped contribute greatly to consumer 
protection, the fact is that most advertisements and related pro-
motional techniques still are not regarded as deceptive.17 
15. "Not until the nineteenth century did judges discover that caveat emptor 
sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, made a man-an economic man-out of the buyer, 
and served well its two masters, business and justice." Hamilton, The Andent Maxim 
Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1186 (1931). 
16. ITC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 1965 Trade Cas. ,i 71194. The Commission 
reasoned that since the seller had no history of selling single cans of paint, its practice 
of allocating the price of two cans to one can and calling the other "free" amounted 
to misrepresentation. A majority of the Court found that there was substantial evidence 
to support the Commission finding. 
17. Occasionally a court will impose liability for economic harm sustained as the 
result of deceptive advertising. For example, in one recent case a court awarded 
damages to the buyer of a new car who claimed that the manufacturer had breached 
its warranty as defined by advertisements that represented its cars to be trouble-free, 
economical, and of high quality. The court felt that "the protection of the defenseless 
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The factor that most frequently renders an advertisement mis-
leading is not the character of the statements that it contains, but 
rather the information that is omitted. To make wise purchase deci-
sions, the consumer needs more factual information about products 
than he now is given. At present, sellers of consumer goods delib-
erately refrain from providing many essential facts, since such infor-
mation often would run counter to advertising claims that their 
products are distinctive. For instance, a producer finds substantial 
economic advantage in conveying the message that a product like 
Clorox is considerably more effective than Purex or other ·brands 
of liquid bleach when, in fact, they are chemically indistinguishable. 
However, producers will not disclose the fact that the chemical com-
position of such products is identical, and this type of deliberate 
omission tends to confuse and mislead consumers. The law of fraud 
and deceit, even though enlarged by the courts, legislatures, and ad-
ministrative agencies, is simply out of touch with market realities. 
This situation is evident from the faGt that the concepts of fraud and 
deceit focus on statements actually made in advertisements, whereas 
the consumer needs information which sellers now fail to disclose. 
A related problem exists with respect to several other govern-
mental policies that are often said to benefit the consumer. For 
example, weights and measures are rigorously controlled by govern-
ments, but if a seller of a consumer product is not required to state 
the weight of his goods, the ability of the National Bureau of Stan-
dards to define and measµre a "pound" with scientific precision is 
irrelevant. Even if a manufacturer states the weight of his product 
on the containers but does so in fractional terms (such as 13% 
ounces in a small box, 19½.6 ounces in a medium size box, and 
281 %2 ounces in a large box), the purchaser, trying to make a judg-
ment as to the "best buy" on a cents-per-ounce basis, is effectively 
frustrated. 
Similarly, the ineffectiveness of current governmental controls 
is evident in regulations dealing with the adulteration of foods and 
other products. While existing law prohibits certain additives, it 
does not always require the manufacturer to state the ingredients 
in an intelligible way. In fact, contents frequently do not have to 
be revealed at all. And when they are, manufacturers may reveal 
consumer has proved its value as a cornerstone in the structure of our national ad-
ministration of justice." Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 141, 209 
N.E.2d 583, 588 (1965). 
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only part of their story; it can be very important to consumers 
whether the amount of water in a particular food mixture is one 
per cent· or fifteen per cent of the total. Again, the law is out of 
touch with market realities, largely because it is essentially negative 
rather than affirmative in its approach-it forbids rather than re-
quires. 
When physical injury is sustained through use of a dangerous 
product (sometimes, one that seems not so dangerous), the courts in 
recent years have been increasingly willing to impose liability on 
the manufacturer. The scope of implied warranties has been mark-
edly expanded, and for this reason, as well as the curtailment or 
outright abolition of the privity element, sellers have been held lia-
ble for harm sustained in the use of a growing list of goods.18 More-
over, the strict liability doctrine has been expanded to provide relief 
in tort for injury caused by unreasonably dangerous products.19 How-
ever, while the much-discussed evolution of doctrine in these areas 
has afforded consumers (and others) additional relief for physical 
injuries they have sustained, related economic losses have been given 
practically no attention. It seems fair to say that consumers "lose" 
far more each year through the deception inherent in the sophisti-
cated means of modem merchandising and by being effectively de-
nied the information needed to make wise purchases than they do 
as the result of physical harm. Surveys show, for instance, that buy-
ers pay about ten per cent more for most goods purchased in super-
markets than they would if they bought only the most economical 
(price adjusted for quantity) packages of such products.20 Even more 
18. The recent developments are surveyed in Ray, Products Liability-A Symposium: 
Introduction, 19 Sw. L.J. 1 (1965). As an instance of the expansion in the law's cover-
age, see Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) 
(bystander allowed recovery for an injury caused by defective shotgun ammunition). 
For general comments, see Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern 
Sales Law: A Comparative Study, 74 YALE L.J. 262 (1964); Southwick, The Disenchanted 
Consumer-Liability for Harmful Products, 18 MICH. Bus. REv. 5 Gan. 1966); Wall 
Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1965, p. 1, col. 6. 
19. For a discussion of the developments, see Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 
5 (1965). 
20. This was the conclusion drawn from a carefully administered test in which 
thirty-three young married women were instructed to select the most economical 
package for each of nventy products on sale at a supermarket. Based on the results 
of this survey, it appears that the typical economy-minded shopper would spend be-
tween nine and ten per cent more than one who was in fact consistently able to 
select the most economical packages. See Friedman, Truth in Packaging in an American 
Supermarket (mimeo. 1965). (A brief version of this paper was presented at the 1965 
annual meeting of the American Psychological Association.) 
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striking, if consumers disregarded trade names and purchased prod-
ucts on the basis of objectively determined values, without regard 
to trade name, savings of as much as fifty per cent could be realized.21 
Since American consumers are currently spending about $100 bil-
lion annually for retail food purchases alone,22 the size of their 
loss is considerable. If provided meaningful information that would 
permit informed purchase decisions, consumers would save a con-
siderable sum of money, and yet the Government has shown very 
little concern for this economically vital aspect of consumer pro• 
tection. 
B. Governmental Activities 
To appreciate more fully the inadequate and haphazard charac-
ter of current consumer protection activities calls for a review of 
existing programs at the federal and state levels. The following as-
sessment will reveal the large number of consumer-related activities 
and will also disclose their disorderliness. 
The most complete available tabulation of federal consumer 
programs, compiled in 1961, showed that thirty-three of the thirty-
five principal departments and agencies of the federal government 
were involved in some activity that protected or promoted consumer 
interests.23 Several of the agencies were responsible for only a single 
activity, but others were engaged in a sizable number of consumer 
programs-ranging from twenty in the Department of Commerce 
to fifty in the Department of Agriculture.24 In the performance of 
those activities which the departments and agencies regarded as 
"directly" protecting and promoting consumer interests (118 of the 
296 activities identified), the Government spent less than a billion 
dollars in 1961.2i; Even though this figure amounted to only about 
one per cent of the federal budget and to less than one third of one 
per cent of total personal consumption expenditures, it is seriously 
21. Oxenfeldt, Consumer Knowledge: Its Measurement and Extent, 32 REv. EcoN, 
&:: STAT. 300 (1950). 
22. The nation's families spend an average of slightly less than 20% of their 
after-tax income for "food prepared at home." Murphy, spending and Saving in Urban 
and Rural Areas, 88 MONTHLY LABOR REv. 1169, 1171-72 (table 1) (1965). Consumer 
expenditures in 1965 reached the $450 billion mark (see note 4 supra) and will climb 
close to $500 billion in 1966. 
23. House Comm. on Government Operations, Consumer Protection Activities of 
Federal Departments and Agencies, H.R. REP. No. 1241, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
The committee's survey was based on questionnaires sent to thirty•five departments 
and agencies. Their detailed responses are contained in the House report. Id. at 63·338. 
24. Id. at 23 (table 1). 
25. Id. at 24 (table 2). 
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overstated, since it includes the compensation of workers who de-
voted some of their time to other job assignments.26 
More important than their number is the diffuse nature of fed-
eral consumer activities. The great bulk of these governmental pro-
grams deal with classical forms of fraud and deception and with the 
enforcement of laws banning the sale of adulterated, unsafe, or un-
tested products, almost exclusively foods and drugs. As in the case 
of court-made doctrine, there is a marked emphasis on activities 
with a negative quality-the prohibition of certain practices and 
the suppression of conduct which could inflict bodily harm. Few 
programs call for the affin;native disclosure of information essential 
to informed purchase decisions. 
Nevertheless, some federal laws and programs have the effect of 
providing a consumer with facts that can be useful in buying prod-
ucts at retail. Food and drug labels must disclose the net weight, 
contents, and manufacturer's identity,27 and under the 1962 Drug 
Act Amendments,28 drugs must bear their generic names as well as 
their trade names. The labels of textile,29 wool,30 and fur31 products 
must also specify content, and disclosure requirements for the sale 
of securities are now common.32 Prices for new automobiles must be 
displayed in accordance with the Automobile Information Disclo-
sure Act of 1958.33 Although it is not mandatory, most meat packers 
avail themselves of the grade-labeling service provided by the De-
partment of Agriculture. Finally, standards of identity are prescribed 
for some food products, and standards have occasionally been estab-
lished to control the size and shape of packages in which such prod-
ucts as bread and milk may be sold.34 
26. Moreover, it is clear that some of the activities which the sponsoring depart-
ments and agencies feel protect or promote consumer interests do not do so. Indeed 
quite the opposite. For example, the Department of Agriculture asserted that its regu-
lation of milk supply and control of sugar production-both of which have the effect 
of raising prices-help the consumer! Id. at 93-95. 
27. See 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1964) (food); 52 Stat. 1050 (1938), 21 
U.S.C. § 352 (1964) (drugs). 
28. 76 Stat. 785 (1962), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-60 (1964). 
29. Textile Fi9er Products Identification Act, 72 Stat. 1717 (1958), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 70-70k (1964). 
30. Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 1128, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1964). 
31. Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69j (1964). 
32. See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964). 
33. See 72 Stat. 325, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-33 (1964). 
34. For a description of the Department of Agriculture's various activities dealing 
with the marketing of food products, see H.R. REP. No. 1241, op. cit. supra note 23, 
at 63-114. For a more general discussion of the Government's current role in the 
marketplace, see MASSEL, CoMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 51-54 (Anchor :Book ed. 1964); 
WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD :BUSINESS ch. 8 (rev. ed. 1960). 
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Thus it can be seen that certain specific problems have been 
identified, and occasionally specific remedies have been devised for 
their resolution. Federal meat inspection was required only after 
the shocking conditions in the country's meat packing plants were 
so starkly revealed by Upton Sinclair in The Jungle. Deaths and hor-
rible injuries attributable to drugs brought about enactment of the 
first federal drug act in 1906 and the subsequent amendments in 
1938 and, following the thalidomide catastrophe, in 1962.3G Simi-
larly, scandal in the securities industry resulted in the pervasive 
scheme of federal legislation, which is designed to provide investors 
with more information and to permit them to sue for losses incurred 
through issuers' misstatements.36 
Several pages could be filled with a recitation of the specific situ-
ations which gave rise to each of the federal consumer-related activ-
ities, but for present purposes it is enough to emphasize that gov-
ernmental policy as it relates to the consumer is random, being 
responsive-to narrowly-defined needs rather than the product of any 
comprehensive effort to assess the situation and develop appropriate, 
generalized corrective programs. This aimless policy is reflected in 
-and in some respects caused by-the absence of any administrative 
apparatus in the federal government designed to view the consumer 
problem as a whole. 
When the National Recovery Ad~inistration was created in the 
summer of 1933, ·a Consumers Advisory Board was appointed to 
assert the interests of the consuming public in the industry code-
making process. Similarly, at the behest of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, a Consumers Counsel was appointed in 1935 by the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Administration. Likewise, in both the Bituminous 
Coal Conservation Act of _1935 and its successor, the National 
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, specific statutory provision was made 
for an Office of the Consumei:s Counsel. The Counsel was charged 
with the responsibility of protecting the interest of the consuming 
public in all proceedings of the National Bituminous Coal Com-
mission.37 
Although ·the establishm~nt of consumer spokesmen in the NRA, 
35. The widespread use by women during early pregnancy of a sleeping pill, 
generally known as thalidomide, resulted in the birth of more than seven thousand 
deformed babies. This disaster and its role in the passage of drug legislation is con• 
sidered in HAruus, THE REAL VOICE 154, 181-93 (1964). 
36. For a discussion of the background to the adoption of federal securities lcgisla• 
tion, see 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 119-28 (1961). 
37. The New Deal experience is thoroughly considered in CAMPBELL, CONSUMER 
REPRESENTATION IN nm NE.W DE.AL (1940). 
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AAA, and the Bituminous Coal Commission was an unequivocal 
attempt to fill the need for assertion of the consumer interest, this 
effort failed to achieve its putpose. The reason for this failure is 
quite apparent. The three agencies to which these spokesmen were 
attached were principally engaged in carrying out programs that 
were designed to assist defined producer groups by artificially raising 
prices that the consumer was expected to pay. While consumer 
spokesmen may have helped somewhat in curtailing the excesses of 
specific agency programs, the facts are that the NRA "codes of fair 
competition" usually called for or brought about price increases; 
that the AAA curtai~ed farm production with the goal of boosting 
farm income by raising commodity prices; and that the principal 
means of dealing with the bituminous coal industry called for a 
complicated system of price-fixing. As a result of these circumstances, 
the consumer view was generally provided no more than a polite 
audience, and sometimes not even that. Indeed, by the time of the 
outbreak of World War II, formal representation of the consumer 
within the federal government was all but nonexistent, just as it 
had been before the 1930's. 
Since 1962 there has been renewed governmental interest in the 
consumer's plight. Steps have been taken by both Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson to give the consumer a spokesman. In 1962 President 
Kennedy, declaring that c;onsumers have a "right to be heard" and 
to have their interests given "full and sympathetic consideration in 
the formulation of Government policy," created a Consumers' 
Advisory Council as an adjunct to the Council of Economic Advisers 
"to examine and provide advice to the Government on issues of 
broad economic policy, on governmental programs protecting con-
sumer needs, and on needed improvements in the flow of consumer 
research material to the pubiic."38 The Council was given somewhat 
more formal status by an Executive Order issued by President John-
son on January 3, 1964.89 In addition to the Council, which is com-
posed of twelve private citizens, President Johnson has also estab-
lished a Committee on Consumer Interests.40 The Committee is 
composed of the private citizens who serve on the Advisory Council 
and representatives of ten governmental agencies. A Special As-
sistant for Consumer Affairs was appointed by the President early 
38. Message on Consumers' Protection and Interest Program, H.R. Doc. No. 364, 
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 15, 1962). 
39. Exec. Order No. 11136, 29 Fed. Reg. 129 (1964). 
40. Ibid. 
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in 1964.41 The holder of this position, currently Esther Peterson 
(who is also an Assistant Secretary of Labor), is the principal spokes-
man for the consumer in the federal government and serves as 
chairman of the Committee on Consumer Interests. 
This conglomeration of councils, committees, and special assis-
tants that supposedly represent consumers at the federal govern-
ment's highest policy-making levels resembles the disorganized and 
random assortment of activities that are carried out by the thirty-
five principal departments and agencies. Groups and individuals 
have been hurriedly assembled to meet a vaguely felt need, but there 
is no clear sense of purpose. Although both a Committee on Con-
sumer Interests and a Consumer Advisory Council exist, it is difficult 
to determine the separate functions which they serve. The Com-
mittee's responsibility is to "consider" federal "policies and programs 
of primary importance to consumers," while the Council has been 
directed to "advise the Government on issues of broad economic 
policy of immediate concern to consumers." Both groups are served 
by the same staff, which in turn reports directly to the Special 
Assistant, and the holder of that office is chairman of the Committee 
and an ex officio member of the Advisory Council. If the Committee 
implemented programs developed by the Council and approved by 
the President, its function would be understandable. However, the 
Committee's job is not to implement, but rather to advise, and that 
is a responsibility also of the Advisory Council. The point at which 
one ends and the other begins is a puzzle, like so much governmental 
activity in the consumer area. 
Perhaps the single most important weakness in the entire scheme 
is the lack of authority noticeable in both the Council and the Com-
mission, as well as in the Special Assistant. Each organization is 
charged with the responsibility of "advising,'' "reviewing," or "con-
sulting," but none has the power to modify, execute, or instigate any 
program of its own. Existing programs designed to aid the con-
sumer are in a state of disarray and reveal many deficiencies, but the 
Advisory Council and the Committee can do no more than hope 
41. In taking steps to appoint consumer representatives in the executive branch of 
the Government, President Johnson, in a message delivered to the Congress on 
February 5, 1964, noted that "for far too long, the consumer has had too little voice 
and too little weight in government. As a worker, as a businessman, as a farmer, as a 
lawyer or doctor, the citizen has been well represented. But as a consumer, he has had 
to take a back seat." H.R. Doc. No. 220, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964). More recently, 
in both his 1966 State of the Union Address and in his Economic Report, the President 
has endorsed legislation designed to assist the consumer. 112 CONG, REc, 129, 131 
(daily ed. Jan. 12, 1966); EcoNOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 19 Gan. 1966), 
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that their recommendations will induce the President and Congress 
to take corrective action. 
Occasional proposals have been made to create a centr~l consumer 
agency to implement and coordinate the numerous federal programs, 
but they have not bet!n seriously considered. Moreover, past pro-
posals have not really promised to meet the need for better organiza-
tion. Creation of a Department of Consumers was urged by Senator 
Kefauver, but his bill was accorded only a single day of hearings and 
then promptly forgotten.42 A group of eighteen senators is currently 
supporting a bill that would establish an independent agency to be 
known as the Office of Consumers.43 This proposed agency would 
be under the direction of a Consumers Counsel, and the Office's 
principal function would be "to protect and promote the interests 
of the people of the United States as consumers." However, as 
in the case of the current Advisory Council and the Committee on 
Consumer Interests, the proposed Office of Consumers would lack 
the authority to plan and carry out programs on behalf of consumers 
and would not encompass any of the nearly three hundred separate 
consumer activities now carried out in many governmental depart-
ments and agencies. If such an office is to play a meaningful role, 
it must have the power to act on its own and to coordinate existing 
consumer activities. 
C. The Inadequacy of State Regulation 
At the state level, consumer representation presents a pattern of 
activity which resembles that at the federal level. Most states have 
some sort of program that protects or promotes the consumer in-
terest; as is true at the federal level, however, the focus is almost 
entirely on the suppression of fraud and on the inspection of food 
and other products for human consumption. Even in these respects, 
the states' programs are considerably less effective than the corre-
sponding activities of the federal government. For example, only 
eighteen states have meat inspection laws which are similar to the 
42. For a brief history of congressional efforts to establish a special consumer 
agency, see Ill CONG. REc. 2254 (Feb. 9, 1965). 
43. See S. 1052, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Senator Hart, chief sponsor of S. 1052, 
has also urged the creation of a national commission to anticipate the problems 
consumers will face in the future. Testimony, supra note 2, at 5-6. Another proposal, 
embodied in a resolution offered by Senator Javits and supported by eighteen other 
senators would establish a Select Senate Committee on Consumers "to conduct a con-
tinuing comprehensive study and investigation with respect to the nature and extent 
of economic problems of consumers within the United States." S. Res. 84, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1965). In 1966 a bill (H.R. 7179) was introduced in the House µiat would 
create a Department of Consumers. 
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federal regulations for meat shipped in interstate commerce.44 Drugs 
· are subjected to some sort of inspection and control in most states, 
but the level of effort is generally so limited as to suggest that the 
programs are extremely inadequate. A survey completed in 1963 
showed that the states at that time were spending approximately 
$1.7 million a year for the regulation of drugs.45 However, nearly a 
third of this amount was spent in California and New York, and, as 
a group, the states spent only about one cent per capita per year 
in this effort. It is also interesting to note that while various in-
dustry practices specifically aimed at consumers are recognized as 
a serious problem, only fourteen states have established a special 
enforcement unit to deal with the diverse problems of consumer 
protection.46 
A few states, though, have been alert to the merchandising atmos-
phere in which we now live and to the resulting needs of consum-
ers. South Carolina, for example, has attempted to regulate some 
packaging practices that may be deceptive or misleading by impos-
ing standards governing size, shape, and label contents. Unfortu-
nately this initiative has not been generally followed, and South Car-
olina officials acknowledge that there must be a broader-based effort 
if the problem is to be dealt with adequately.47 
Once, therefore, we lay aside questions of outright fraud and 
adulteration, governmental policy is a maze of specific requirements. 
At both federal and state levels there is no uniformity with respect 
to such important matters as standards of identity, disclosure of 
weight and content, quality grading, or packaging requirements. 
Nevertheless, each of these subjects is of material significance to 
the consumer who wishes to make purchases on a rational basis 
rather than by a combination of luck and guesswork. 
44. "Although all the states have some legal requirements concerning the sanitation 
of slaughtering and processing facilities and the adulteration and misbranding of meat 
products, in only 30 is there legal authority for ante and post mortem inspection and 
in only 18 is such inspection mandatory." House Comm. on Government Operations, 
Consumer Protection Activities of State Governments, H.R. REP. No, 921, 88th Cong,, 
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 17 (1963). About 20% of the commercially slaughtered meat in the 
United States is not subject to existing federal meat inspection regulation because it 
moves only in intrastate commerce. 
45. House Comm. on Government Operations, Consumer Protection Activities of 
State Governments, H.R. REP. No. 921, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 12 (table 2-A) 
(1963). 
46. In 1965 special consumer protection officials were provided for by statute in 
Hawaii and North Dakota. Such offices also exist in California, Michigan, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and several other states. See State Government News, Oct. 1965, 
47. The South Carolina experience is discussed in Hearings on Pacliaging and 
Labeling Legislation Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 220·28 (1963). 
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The failure to provide an organizational apparatus that can deal 
with consumer matters deliberately and comprehensively is itself 
compelling evidence of the weakness in the entire effort to secure 
government recognition of consumer problems. However, the lack 
of effective organization is not so much a cause as it is a symptom 
of other deficiencies. The arguments advanced in support of pleas 
for the consumer are themselves typically disorganized and random, 
stemming from a variety of divergent assumptions and philosophic 
positions that are generally unsystematic in their analysis and con-
clusions. 
II. CONSUMERS' INTEREST. V. PRODUCERS' lNTEREsr 
A. The Traditional Arguments for Consumer Protection 
Although it has been said that "the question of the protection of 
the consumer is one of perennial interest of history,"48 governmental 
assistance, as the preceding discussion shows, has been notably er-
ratic, leaving a continuing appearance of inadequacy. The blame, if 
that is the right word, appears to lie less in the inattentiveness of 
politicians than in the insufficiency and inconsistency of the tradi-
tional arguments offered by many proponents of governmental aid 
for the consumer. 
Many of the pleas for the consumer, for example, have come from 
critics who appear to be fundamentally hostile to a market system in 
which resources are allocated through a price mechanism, although 
they rarely phrase their argument in this fashion. Logically, how-
ever, such critics reject programs designed to increase the efficiency 
of our current market system and call instead for a radical overhaul 
of the economic order. To be specific, if one accepts the view that 
contemporary society is either "a network of rackets," as did the late 
C. Wright Mills,49 or a world in which "producers have secured 
power" that they use "to rob the rest,"50 or in which advertising 
causes us to buy goods "we do not want at prices we cannot pay 
and on terms we cannot meet,"51 it is unlikely that minor institu-
48. LEvETr, op. cit. supra note 8, at 15. 
49. Mills' views are discussed in MAsrERs, THE !NTELUGENT BUYER'S GUIDE TO 
SELLERS 91 (1965). 
50. See BENN, PRODUCER v. CONSUMER 25 (1928). The feeling of exploitation on the 
part of the consumer is sometimes justified by the seller's stated intentions. Walton 
Hamilton quotes the head of a large department store as saying, "God created the 
masses of mankind to be exploited. I exploit them; I do his will." Hamilton, supra 
note 15, at 1135 n.7. 
51. This is an excerpt from a statement by Robert Hutchins, quoted in MAsrERs, 
op. cit. supra note 49, at 87. Testifying in 1961, Marya Mannes said that "as a house-
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tional adjustments would be an adequate remedy. Similarly, if 
consumers are viewed as being pitted against producers in a bloodless 
class war52 ( one writer proposed as a motto, "Consumers of the 
World, Arise! United We Stand, Divided We Pay Morel"), a revo-
lution is needed rather than consumer legislation of the kind that 
is usually suggested. 
Some Socialists and the New Radicals have openly conceded that 
in their opinion the only answer to the problems faced by the con-
sumer lies in control of production itself. Nineteenth century leaders 
of the consumer movement in England spoke of "getting the whole 
profit of production, out of the hands of the manufacturer and 
trader, for the consumer.''53 This position makes very good sense if 
a capitalistic system is looked upon as essentially an instrument of 
exploitation. On the basis of this assumption, no effort to aid the 
consumer can be successful, for no other group can be permitted to 
retain control over the productive process. 
Reflecting a similar position, but with a far less rational expres-
sion of opinion, the so-called New Radicals, as one member of this 
school of thought recently stated, regard "political free enterprise 
... as illusory as the economic, largely because the economic model 
is a fraud .... Much of the sham of pluralism stems from the 
unchallenged domination of the values of the marketplace, the 
fact that profit still motivates production, communication, educa-
tion.''54 Naturally enough, this position dictates radical reform. 
However, whereas the classical Socialists had a system to advance as 
a substitute for the status quo, the New Radicals have nothing spe• 
cific to suggest. For example, the author of the foregoing quotation 
concluded his message with the useless generalization that "the great 
corporations should, somehow, be made responsible to workers and 
consumers.''55 
wife I buy what is sold to me. It is packaged. I buy it on faith. This is why, these days, 
the word 'consumer' is sometimes spelled 's-u-c-k-e-r.'" Hearings on Packaging and 
Labeling Practices Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 24 (1961). Seventeen hundred years ago Diogenes Laertius 
commented that "the market is a place set apart where men may deceive each other.'' 
Quoted in Consumer Reports, July 1965, p. 346. However, "without some dissimulation 
no business can be carried on at all," noted the Earl of Chesterfield. Quoted in 
MAsn:Rs, op. cit. supra note 49, at 89. 
52. See PEI, THE CONSUMER'S MANIFESTO (1960). 
53. WEBB, THE D1scoVERY OF nm CONSUMER 11 (1928). This statement is attributed 
to J. T. W. Mitchell, a leader in the nineteenth century British cooperative movement, 
54. Gitlin, Power and the Myth of Progress, The New Republic, Dec. 25, 1965, 
p. 19. 
55. Id. at 21. 
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Although the views of many persons who seek governmental aid 
for the consumer implicitly call for a fundamental change in the 
existing economic -system, most consumer spokesmen tend either to 
limit their proposals to the narrow and specific or to phrase their 
arguments in such vague terms as to offer no real policy guidance. 
No consistent effort has been made to identify underlying causes 
and to assess the full range of government responses. 
Several factors help explain why the problems encountered by 
consumers have not been assayed systematically. Initially, since every-
one is a consumer, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between the 
interests of consumers and those of society as a whole. As General 
Hugh S. Johnson, head of the NRA, once stated, "The consumer 
interest is the public interest, and I represent the public."56 Busi-
nessmen, laborers, farmers, and producer groups in general seem to 
be more easily identified than consumers. Related to this problem 
of identification is the fact that consumers are "straddlers"-they 
are often both consumers and producers, simultaneously, and their 
interests often conflict. A steelworker's demand for a pay raise may 
lead to an increase in the price of steel and products made largely 
from steel, like autos and refrigerators. 
Moreover, with the possible exception of cooperatives (which 
have not attracted many adherents in the United States), consumers 
have never been effectively organized. On the other hand, workers, 
businessmen, farmers-again, the producing groups-have com-
bined in organizations that aggressively assert the interests of their 
members. Trade associations, which are well-financed and staffed by 
persons who are capable of bringing their full weight to bear at the 
most critical points in the governmental process, are common through-
out industry. In light of the additional fact that consumers have 
never had a government agency to speak in their behalf (again, this 
may be less a cause than a result), it is easy to understand why gov-
ernmental efforts in aid of the consumer have been limited, erratic, 
and more responsive than creative. 
B. Producers' Self-Protection Through 
Restriction of Competition 
In contrast to the consumer, whose needs have been ill-defined57 
and on whose behalf governmental action has been inadequate and 
56. Quoted in CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 37, at 263. 
57. As late as 1929 at least one author felt that "the consumer in history ••• [is] 
a subject never before treated." LEvErr, op. cit. supra note 8, inside cover. The situation 
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generally peripheral,58 producers have recognized that their eco-
nomic interest lies in the restriction of competition. Farmers, labor-
ers, and corporations have all seen that their' rewards can be increased 
(at least in the short run) by curtailing supply or otherwise imped-
ing the operation of the market mechanism. As well, these groups 
have realized, quite correctly, that government can be used as an in-
strument of monopoly if it is properly manipulated.119 Thus, farmers 
have secured active government aid in checking output, thereby 
boosting the prices of farm products to the consumer. Growers of 
domestic sugar and tobacco have perpetuated a system that rigidly 
controls output, to the detriment of the ultimate consumer. Under 
the guise of "fair trade," many states have allowed manufacturers to 
maintain resale prices, thus denying the consumer the substantial 
benefits of retail price competition. The federal government's par-
ticipation in the international coffee cartel and in the International 
Air Transport Association means higher prices and raises an um-
brella over the heads of inefficient producers. Entry into air trans-
portation is tightly restricted, resulting in much higher fares on 
heavily traveled routes than would otherwise prevail.60 Oil import 
quotas severely limit the importation of oil from abroad, even 
has improved somewhat, but consumer affairs still receive only limited attention. Cur-
rent research by economists, psychologists, sociologists, and others is largely confined to 
a sophisticated examination of consumer behavior and accords little attention to the 
practical problems of the consumer or the appropriate role of governmental action, 
58. Although he regarded consumption as "the sole end and purpose of all produc-
tion," Adam Smith observed that "the interest of the consumer is almost constantly 
sacrificed to that of the producer; and [the economic system] ••• seems to consider 
production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and 
commerce." SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 625 (Modem Library ed. 1937). 
59. Government's role as a begctter of monopoly and as a foe of competition is 
considered in ADAMS & GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA (1955); WILCOX, op. cit. supra 
note 34, pt. III. 
60. As one illustration, the weekday fare aboard the Eastern Air Lines shuttle 
between New York and Washington, a distance of 216 miles, is eighteen dollars. Entry 
is restricted in this market, and Eastern accounts for _about 80% of the traffic. By 
contrast, along the Los Angeles-San Francisco route, where entry is unrestricted, the 
fare is now twelve dollars, although the distance between the two points is 847 miles. 
While operating conditions arc not entirely the same, the difference in fare is much 
too large to be explained by these factors alone. A more plausible reason is that the 
Los Angeles-San Francisco fare is competitively determined. For a careful examination 
of the facts and an assessment of policy implications, see Levine, Is Regulation Neces-
sary?-California Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 
1416 (1965). Other relevant material may be found in The New Republic, Jan, 15, 
1966, p. 8; 111 CONG. REc. 16735-43 (1965). Viewing the problem more generally, it is 
apparent that fares on heavily traveled air routes are used to generate revenue from 
which low-density routes may be internally subsidized. See Barber, Airline Mergers, 
Monopoly, and the CAB, 28 J. AIR LAW & COMMERCE 189, 235-36 (1962}, 
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though it could be delivered to East Coast refineries at a saving of 
a dollar or more per barrel over domestic oil.61 
American industry, however, does not always need the affirma-
tive assistance of government to achieve monopolistic objectives. 
Such objectives may also be attained if government is merely held 
at bay-if enforcement of the antitrust laws is subdued so that mar-
kets can be dominated by one firm or by a small number of firms. 
If output can be restricted to one or a very few firms, the "compet-
itors" can exercise power over price and obtain a profit substantially 
in excess .of that attainable under competition. Of all governmental 
practices or omissions that have had the effect of hurting the con-
sumer, probably the most grievous lies simply in the failure to 
enforce the antitrust laws with sufficient vigor and imagination to 
curtail monopolistic selling power. The federal government's non-
feasance in this respect has permitted dominant firms in most of 
the country's manufacturing industries to inflict a toll on consumers, 
in the form of noncompetitive prices, that is no doubt vastly larger 
than any losses they have sustained through practices that form the 
subject of most consumer complaints. 
III. THE CONSUMER IN A CHANGING ECONOMY: 
THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENTAL ACTION 
Most of the arguments offered in support of governmental aid for 
the consumer have been so misdirected and unsystematic that an ef-
fort must be made to restate the problem, placing it in its larger 
economic perspective. This task calls for some reflection on the basic 
features of a competitive system, for it is· only by understanding the 
fundamentals of the situation that a rational remedial program can 
be devised. 
A. T~e Decline of Competitive Markets 
Many people seem to think that the United States has a compet-
itive economy in which resources are allocated according to the pat-
terns described by the classical theorists. To a certain extent this as-
sumption is correct, but in most markets one seller or a small group 
of sellers account for the bulk of the output. Under these circum-
stances, meaningful price competition does not exist, and prices and 
61. Adelman, Efficiency of Resource Use in Crude Petroleum, 31 SOUTHERN Eco-
NOMIC J. 101 (1964); Burel<, U.S. Oil: A Giant Caught In Its Own Web, Fortune, 
April 1965, p. 202. Since domestic oil now sells for approximately three dollars per 
barrel (the exact price, of course, depends on the grade), the cost of the import oil 
program to the consumer is by no means insignificant. 
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profits are generally above the competitive level.62 Most important, 
for present purposes, the character of inter-firm competition in such 
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets makes it extremely difficult 
for the consumer to perform his critical allocative function, since he 
is denied the information necessary to make informed decisions. 
Classical economists focused their attention on the production 
function, but they also assumed that just as producers would en-
deavor to maximize their returns, so too would the consumer seek 
to maximize the amount of satisfaction or utility that he could ob-
tain from his income. According to the marginalists-Jevons, Men-
ger, and Walras-the consumer would achieve that objective by ad-
justing his outlay for each good or service in accordance with the 
price and the satisfaction it provides him. 63 While this is perfectly 
sound theory, it is important to examine the underlying assumptions 
about the market in which the buyer makes his selections. 
The designers of the classical model reasoned that there would 
be optimal allocation of resources if markets were competitively 
structured, if buyers and sellers possessed adequate information 
about prices and the availability of goods, and if sales were made 
without artificial restrictions of any form. Moreover, it was assumed 
that all goods of the sa~e type were fungible. If all of these condi-
tions are present, so the theory goes, utilities are maximized, and 
the society secures the fullest possible benefit out of its resources. 
In effect, a perfect balance is struck; producers (sellers) and consum-
ers (buyers) are on an equal footing, and neither group will be able 
to take advantage of the other. 
Today the essential conditions for competition do not exist, and 
as a result the consumer has been placed in a disadvantageous posi-
tion. The classical economists assumed that each industry would al-
ways have a large number of sellers, with the result that no individ-
ual seller would have sufficient economic power to control prices. 
However, in reality many industries are dominated by a few large 
sellers, and typically these dominant concerns act jointly like a 
monopolist. Moreover, even though many products of a particular 
type are in fact physically homogeneous, they are effectively por-
trayed as distinctive items through the instruments of modern mer-
62. The character of competition in oligopolistic markets is examined in FELLNER, 
COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW (1949); MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COM• 
PETITION, chs. 11-15 (1952). The relationship between structure and performance is 
assessed in BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 406-27 (1959). 
63. See LEFrWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND REsOURCE ALLOCATION 49-68 (1955); MAR• 
SHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 83-137 (8th ed. 1948); STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 
42-95 (1952). 
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chandising propaganda. Finally, prices-the vital mechanism for 
proper resource allocation-are often ambiguous or, for a variety of 
other reasons, not subject to ready comparison. In short, the corner-
stones of competition have been pulled out. Nevertheless, at least 
some of those cornerstones, and perhaps all of them, can be replaced 
with the aid of the Government if we identify the forces that brought 
about their destruction. 
B. The Effect of Trade Names and Advertising 
Throughout a large part of our industrial history, retail goods 
of the same type were regarded as fungible. However, in the late 
nineteenth century, manufacturers, whose number was declining 
as a result of consolidation, saw that it was to their economic ad-
vantage to differentiate their wares, not in terms of quality or 
content, but rather under cover of a trade name. In 1899 the Na-
tional Biscuit Company brought out its Uneeda brand of crackers, 
making the cracker barrel a part of American folklore. About the 
same time the cigarette companies intensified their emphasis on 
brand names. This emphasis on trade names spread very rapidly to 
nearly all consumers' goods industries, and by the middle 1920's cer-
tain trade names had acquired great value. For example, during this 
period the trade names "Jell-O" and "Maxwell House" were sold 
for $35 million and $42 million respectively.64 
Today advertising is ubiquitous. Indeed, advertising revenues 
practically support the mass media, as evidenced by the fact that in 
1964 advertisers spent nearly fourteen billion dollars in promoting 
their wares. 65 Modern advertising techniques are annoying to many 
people, but, more important, these techniques have played a large 
and effective role in differentiating physically interchangeable prod-
ucts, thus making consumer purchase decisions complex and ineffi-
cient and, at the same time, creating and ensconcing the· monopo-
listic positions held by many manufacturers. · 
The sale of soap and other cleaning products offers a good illus-
tration of the role which advertising plays in the market process. For 
example, liquid household bleach is a 5.25 per cent sodium hypo-
chlorite solution, regardless of the trade name it bears. However, by " 
64. For a study of the early use of brand names and their steeply rising value, see 
Lynd, The People as Consumers, in II RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE U.S. 874-76 (1933). 
Chamberlin has taken note of the role that trademarks (and related aspects of legally 
protected product differentiation) play in the protection of monopoly. CHAMBERLIN, 
THE THEORY OF MONOPOLI5I"IC CoMPETlTION, app. E, at 270 (7th ed. 1956). 
65. See Printers' Ink, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 12. 
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a deluge of advertising, sellers have succeeded so well in differenti-
ating one trade-named bleach from another that sales of a particular 
product are largely govemt!d by the size of the seller's advertising 
expenditures. As a result of the strong consumer identification of the 
best-knmm brands of liquid bleach, like Clorox and Purex, it has 
been possible to sell them at prices above those of lesser-known 
brands possessing identical chemical properties. 66 
The Monsanto Company discovered this effect of advertising 
when it tried to sell All, a low-sudsing. detergent, in competition 
with _experts in big-time advertising. Monsanto soon learned that it 
was not product quality, but rather advertising that was required to 
compete effectively with Procter & Gamble, makers of Dash, and 
Colgate-Palmolive, makers of Ad. However, apparently Monsanto 
did not fully appreciate the importance of advertising, for between 
1955 and 1956 it reduced its advertising outlay from twelve million 
· dollars to nine million dollars, and during this same period its 
share of the market fell promptly from seventy-nine per cent to 
fifty-five per cent. Shortly thereafter Monsanto sold All to Lever 
Brothers, a firm that could better appreciate the realities of a market 
in which advertising is the difference between survival and obliv-
ion. 01 
Although it is. a fact of modern life, advertising is nevertheless 
itself only a symptom of the kind of nonprice competition that exists 
in many American industries, including soaps. In the soap industry 
three companies, each producing a broad line of products, account 
for nearly ninety per cent of total sales. With a tight oligopolistic 
structure such as this, theory indicates-and observation confirms 
-that the dominant firms prosper through the covert elimination 
of price competition, confining their rivalry to other strategies.68 
66. The manifestations and implications of nonprice competition in the sale of 
liquid household bleach were thoroughly considered by Commissioner Elman in his 
opinion for the FTC in the Procter & Gamble-Clorox proceeding. 3 CCH TRADE REG, 
REP. (1963-65 transfer binder) ,I 16673. The Commission held that Procter &: Gamble's 
acquisition of Clorox violated § 7 of the Clayton Act. See also General Foods Corp,, 
3 id. ,I 17161 (1964). 
67. Monsanto's experience with All and related aspects of competition in the low-
suds detergent market came to light in the trial of a Government suit challenging the 
legality of the Lever Brothers acquisition. United States v, Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. 
Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also Klaw, The Soap Wars: A Strategic Analysis, 
Fortune, June 1963, p. 122. 
68. For example, soap companies have competed in the amount of suds that their 
cleaning products can be made to produce. So "successful" were they in this endeavor 
that housewives were conditioned mistakenly to equate the quantity of suds with 
cleaning efficiency. Whiteside, The Suds Conflict, The New Yorker, Dec. 19, 1964, p. 42, 
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This situation is not necessarily the result of a conscious policy, for 
the very structure of an oligopolistic market inhibits price competi-
tion. While advertising seems unreasonably costly in many instances 
(for example, Procter & Gamble spent $161 million on advertising 
in 1964, a sum equal to about eight per cent of its sales and 120 per 
cent of its after-tax profits), it enables the dominant firms to sell their 
wares at a price that yields a comparatively high return on invest-
ment. Procter & Gamble's fifteen per cent return on its invested 
capital in 1964 was nearly twice as great as that earned by manu-
facturing companies generally. 69 In addition, advertising accentuates 
product differentiation and thereby creates an important barrier to 
entry by potential competitors.70 Thus, advertising both epitomizes 
"competition" in oligopolistic industries--like soaps, cigarettes, 
many foods, personal products, and assorted durabie goods--and 
serves as a weapon that prevents encroachment on the position held 
by the dominant firms. These implications are of obvious impor-
tance to the consumer, for they mean that he must deal with quasi-
monopolists on disadvantageous terms, particularly with respect to 
price. A factor which aggravates the situation still more is that ad-
vertising is "both the major medium of information for consumers 
and the major method of misinformation."71 In short, the retail pur-
chaser must depend on the seller for the information he needs to 
make a purchase decision, and in oligopolistic xp.arkets the seller 
uses advertising to confuse the buyer, not to inform him. 
C. The Impersonality of Modern Markets 
The problems of the consumer in dealing with the realities of 
the marketplace are accentuated by the changing nature of retailing 
itself. The rise of the supermarket and, more recently, the discount 
69. Data on Procter 8: Gamble's profits and sales are derived from Fortune, July 
1965, p. 150 (the Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations). 
Advertising data are from Advertising Age, June 28, 1965', p. 46. 
70. "The most important barrier to entry discovered by d~tailed study is probably 
product differentiation." BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 216 (1956). It was the 
risk of creating a higher barrier to entry that led the FTC to condemn Procter 8: 
Gamble's acquisition of Clorox. 3 CCH TRADE REG., REP. (1963-65 transfer binder) 
f 16673, at 21570-72, 21579-80. The quantity discounts available to large advertisers 
greatly reduce their cost of advertising and give them a significant advantage over 
smaller rivals. See Blake 8: Blum, Network Television Rate Practices: A Case Study in 
the Failure of Social Control of Price Discrimination, 74 YALE L.J. 1339 (1965). 
71. NORRIS, THE 'THEORY OF CONSUMER'S DEMAND 181 (1952). Newspapers, it has 
been hypothesized, are read as much for the advertisements they carry as for the news 
they present. See FERGUSON, THE ADVERTISING RATE SmucrURE IN THE DAILY NEWSPAPER 
INDUSIRY (1963). 
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store has meant that retailing has become intensely impersonal. At 
one time the retailer was a source of information about the products 
he sold, but the modern supermarket-offering as many as 7,500 prod-
ucts-is a symbel of the impersonality which has been the basis for 
so many complaints. IJ1 fact, as a result of the character of contem-
porary retail establishments, the vastly increased number of consumer 
products, and the misleading, deceptive, and generally uninforma-
tive aspects of advertising and packaging, the consumer simply lacks 
the information necessary to enable him to buy wisely. 
D. Deceptive Pricing 
.. 
Prices, supposedly the common denominator in a free economy, 
are no longer stated clearly. Packages marked "five cents off regular 
price" tell the buyer very little, since there is no "regular price." 
Moreover, even when a price is not stated ambiguously, it frequently 
cannot be compared with prices for other brands of the same product, 
since the physical characteristics of the products may be unknown, 
and since advertising accentuates the supposed differences among 
products rather than revealing their physical similarities. Indeed, 
the stated prices for various package sizes of the same product are 
often very difficult to compare. For example, it would be hard for 
a typical shopper to select the best price-per-ounce size from among 
the following packages of the same brand of cookies: one pound for 
forty-nine cents, eleven ounces for thirty-four cents, and 6.5 ounces 
for twenty-five cents. In many cases it is cheaper to buy two smaller 
units of a given product than one "giant economy size." When prices 
cannot be directly compared, it is fiction to talk of the allocative 
efficiencies of a price system. 
To sum up, modem consumer markets are a long way removed 
from those that classical economics presupposed. Sellers are few and 
confine their rivalry to nonprice factors. Products, though fungible, 
are differentiated through advertising, packaging, and other tricks 
of contemporary merchandising. Price data are often vague or mis-
leading. Finally, the growing impersonality of retailing makes the 
situation worse. If the consumer, now drifting aimlessly on a great 
sea of irrelevant information, is to be placed in a position where 
he can make informed purchase decisions, governmental action 
is essential. However, such action must be carefully designed to meet 
the problem at its source and not be oriented simply to the eradica-
tion of a few symptoms. 
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IV. GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSUMER: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 
"The awful bewilderment of consumers," as Henry C. Simons 
once stated, can best be corrected by developing, through govern-
mental action, some means of "protective coloration for the buyer."72 
In addition, it appears that more competition must be created by 
reducing the existing high levels of concentration that characterize 
many of the industries which make and sell consumer products. 
A vigorous, imaginative program of antitrust enforcement must be 
an integral part of any effort to help the consumer. 
Basically what the consumer should have is more factual infor-
mation about the products he buys-about their price, package con-
tents, quality, and the relative merits of one brand as compared with 
another of the same general type. Knowledge is the key to the con-
sumer problem if it is made availa:ble in readily comprehensible 
form at the time of the purchase decision. Only then will the con-
sumer be placed in a position to make decisions rationally rather 
than on the basis of guesswork, thereby allowing the price system 
to perform the vital allocative function it should. 
A governmental program designed to provide the consumer with 
product information must have several elements, but one essential 
element is that consumers must be informed about the physical 
properties of products they are buying, such as weight, volume, and 
number of units. Such information should be immediately avail-
able at the time of purchase; it should be expressed clearly and with-
out qualifications that might tend to mislead. These facts should be 
presented in a prominent place on the package or container and in 
a form that is legible and free from graphic distortion. In addition, 
a product's ingredients should be revealed, both by name and by 
percentage of composition. It may make a great deal of difference, 
for example, whether a chemical additive constitutes one per cent 
rather than ten per cent of a given product's contents. Such matters 
are so basic that it is hard to see why anyone would object to insis-
tence on their publication. However, in spite of the fact that the 
publishers of Advertising Age, probably the leading trade journal, 
72. Simons, The Requisites of Free Competition, 26 AM. EcoN. REv. 68, 73 (Supp. 
March 1936). J. M. Clark took essentially the same view, finding that "customer com• 
petence ••• [is] a pre-requisite to healthy competition and does not take care of itself 
in an age of new products and applied science, but affords many problems of policy 
and implementation." CLARK, CoMPETlTION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 466 (1961). More 
than a century ago John Stuart Mill, who was certainly not a proponent of govern-
ment intervention in the economy, spoke out in favor of state action whenever the 
customer is not "a competent judge of the commodity." MILL, PRINCIPLES OF PoUTICAL 
EcoNOMY, bk. v, ch .. XI, § 8 (1848). 
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conceded that "it does seem reasonable to ask manufacturers to stan-
dardize their multiplicity of sizes and to present pertinent contents 
data in a prominent enough position (on their packages), so that 
consumers can be spared unnecessary confusion,"73 Senator Hart's 
Truth-in-Packaging Bill, which would impose such a disclosure re-
quirement, has been as bitterly opposed by food, soap, and other 
producers as if it threatened to control prices.74 
Although a consumer must have accurate information about the 
physical content of a package, this knowledge alone is not adequate 
to put him in a position to make an intelligent purchase decision. 
He must also know something more about the product itself, espe-
cially its quality. The person in the best position to provide that in-
formation is the manufacturer. Under existing conditions, however, 
most manufacturers will not reveal this kind of information, prefer-
ring to hide behind a well-advertised trade name that emphasizes 
their product's supposed uniqueness. It is in this type of situation 
that the Government must intervene by requiring publication on a 
package's label of certain essential information about the product 
itself. 
What information should be disclosed, and what form should it 
take? First, the general characteristics of a product should be de-
scribed by its generic name. A household liquid bleach, though it 
may bear the name Purex or Clorox, should also state on its label 
that it is "household liquid bleach." Generic labeling is now re-
73. March 25, 1963, p. 16. 
74. First introduced in 1962 at the end of the Eighty-seventh Congress and then 
proposed again, in revised form, in the Eighty-eighth (S. 387) and Eighty-ninth Con• 
gresses (S. 985), the Truth-in-Packaging Bill (technically termed the Fair Packaging 
and Labeling Act) would make it mandatory for the FTC and the FDA to promulgate 
regulations requiring the net quantity of contents to be stated upon the front panel 
of packages containing consumer commodities, establishing minimum standards with 
respect to the prominence of statements of the net quantity of contents, prohibiting 
the addition of any qualifying words or phrases to such statements of net quantity of 
contents, forbidding any representation that consumer goods arc being offered for 
retail sale at a price lower than the ordinary retail sale price, and preventing the place• 
ment upon any package of any pictorial matter which is likely to deceive retail pur• 
chasers in any material respect as to the contents of that package. In addition, when 
certain preliminary conditions are satisfied, the bill authorizes additional regulations 
to be issued pertaining to, among other things, the weight and volume of containers 
in which a commodity may be distributed. The bill has been the subject of extensive 
hearings. See Hearings on Packaging and Labeling Practices Before the Senate Sub• 
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-3 (1961): Hearings, 
id., 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-3 (1962): Hearings, id., 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1·3 
(1963); Hearings on Fair Packaging and Labeling Before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Perhaps the best single explanation of the bill 
is Senator Hart's 1965 statement before the Senate Commerce Committee. Id, at 719-32, 
The bill was reported to the Senate by the Commerce Committee on May 13, 1966, 
and was passed by the Senate on June 9 in a form somewhat different from that 
introduced. 
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quired for drugs, pursuant to the 1962 Drug Amendments Act.75 
Second, where products of a certain type vary in quality, as is often 
the case, they should be graded, and the label should designate the 
appropriate classification. Product grading is now done for meats and 
certain other food products, but the concept should be extended to 
a wide range of other household commodities. Third, where neces-
sary to avoid deception and to minimize confusion, packages should 
be standardized in terms of size and, perhaps, container design.76 
Fourth, a package's physical content and the product's ingredients 
should be stated in a prominent place on the label.77 One specific 
procedure to implement this suggestion, now in wide use in Swe-
den, 78 would call for such information (and no other) to be placed 
in a black-bordered square or rectangle that would occupy not less 
than twenty-five per cent of the container's surface area. The re-
mainder of the package could contain any matter that the manufac-
turer might wish to provide, such a,s the product's trade name and 
other traditional merchandi~ing representations. 
If the foregoing requirements, particularly those relating to ge-
neric designation and quality grading, are to be satisfied, the federal 
government will have to play an active role with, it is hoped, in-
dustry cooperation. Minimum standards and basic definitions will 
have to be agreed upon and promulgated in the form of regulations. 
At present the Food and Drug Administration promulgates stan-
dards of identity for many products, and meats af!.d certain other 
foods are graded by the Department of Agriculture.79 Similarly, for 
75. Hearings on Packaging and Labeling Legislation Before the Senate Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 956-57 (1963). 
76. See MASTERS, op. cit. supra note 49, at 157. The need for some standardization 
of packaging is acute in the sale of certain products. For instance, potato chips are 
now sold in seventy-one different weight packages, all of which are under 3½ pounds. 
77. The British Committee on Consumer Protection made a similar recommendation 
in its final report in 1962, stating that "readily available, adequate and accurate 
product information is of the first importance to the consumer. It should be given 
by label in standard form.'' FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMilTEE ON CONSUMER PR.o-
TECTION 303-04 (1962). 
78. The Swedish VDN system is sponsored by the Institute for Informative Label-
ing (Varudeklarationsnamnden), a private organization partly subsidized by the 
Swedish government. When a label is approved it bears the Institute's symbol. For a 
general description of the system; see id. at 26-27. The British are now using a tech-
nique called Teltag Informative Labeling, which is sponsored by the Consumer Council. 
See note 92 infra. This labeling technique reveals information about a product's 
construction, performance rating, and other physical and qualitative features. Council 
on Consumer Information Newsletter (Dec. 1965). 
79. For a description of the many programs carried out by the Department of 
Agriculture, the FDA, and other agencies in the areas of labeling, product standardiza-
tion, and grading, see House Comm. on Government Operations, Consumer Protection 
Activities of Federal Departments and Agencies, H.R. REP. No. 1241, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 63-65, 68-70, 73, 141, 144-45, 161-62, 197, 221, 274, 329 (1961). 
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forty years the Department of Commerce has cooperated with in-
dustry in the formulation of commodity standards. so Comparable 
efforts have been made in the standardization of packages and con-
tainers. 81 
While a compulsory program of the kind outlined above would 
very likely engender industry opposition, the fact that the proposals 
are not very radical provides hope that at least some segments of the 
business community would cooperate willingly. Those sellers who 
feel that their product is as good as a widely advertised brand would 
have much to gain from a program that emphasizes objective fea-
tures and thus permits a shopper to buy on the basis of price and 
other meaningful criteria. A private-brand seller or a lesser-known 
producer of liquid bleach would be placed in a position where he 
could compete far more effectively with the popular brands such as 
Clorox or Purex.82 But whatever the opposition, consumers must 
have factual information of the type indicated above, and they will 
not get it if the Government stands on the sidelines while buyers 
make their purchases under conditions of ignorance and deception.88 
80. The Commerce Department's commodity standards program is designed to 
establish quality levels for manufactured products. More than five hundred commodity 
standards have been promulgated. Compliance is voluntary. H.R. REP. No. 1241, op. cit, 
supra note 79, at 141-42. For a general discussion of quality grading and standardiza• 
tion, see CAMPBELL, THE CONSUMER. INTEREST, ch. VIII (1949). 
81. The Department of Agriculture, for example, has prescribed a standard pack 
for various fresh fruits and a standard fill for containers. Many states (including New 
York, Michigan, and California) require the use of standard packages for the sale of 
such products as milk, bread, and flour. Hearings, supra note 75, at 852, 883, 899, 910. 
82. Irston Barnes feels that the availability of qualitative information "would do 
much to equalize competitive opportunities between firms of disparate size, for the 
small firm is frequently capable of achieving competitive standards of cost in produc-
tion but is quite unable to sustain the burden of unlimited competitive advertising," 
Hearings on Packaging and Labeling Legislation Before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 384 (1963), Sec also note 70 
supra. It should be emphasized that while efforts to provide the consumer with more 
information may necessitate some quality grading and standardization, care must be 
taken so that this program does not unduly eliminate significant varieties of price 
and nonprice competition. Sellers are always ready to cooperate with government in 
any effort that would eliminate competition. However, there is adequate room in 
which to achieve quality grading and product and package standardization without 
curtailing seller competition. 
83. "Objective standards and informative labels . . • would tell the consumer 
exactly what he was getting, direct his attention to quality and performance, and 
facilitate comparisons. And if such standards were generally available, the consumer 
might come to rely upon them more and to believe in advertising less." WILCOX, 
PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 206 (1960). Brand-name manufacturers and their 
supporters would probably view the proposals advanced in the text as bordering on 
the revolutionary. However, in reality these proposals represent a very conservative 
approach to the consumer problem, since they would not directly restrict advertising, 
but rather would simply help provide the retail buyer with vital information, Some 
observers, of course, would regard this as far too cautious an approach, They would 
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While industry cooperation would greatly simplify the matter, 
the present administrative process is capable of adapting to the chal-
lenges of a comprehensive program for the labeling and grad_ing of 
consumer products. Existing agencies-the Food and Drug Admin-
istration and the Federal Trade Commission-could perform this 
function by issuing appropriate regulations.84 Alternatively, a new 
agency could assume the responsibility.85 Such a program would nat-
urally demand greater financial support than is now accorded federal 
consumer activities, but in an economy where nearly a half trillion 
dollars is spent annually by consumers, it can hardly be suggested 
that the cost would be unduly burdensome. Indeed, such a program 
would easily pay for itself by increasing the efficiency of consumption. 
However, no program to help the consumer can be complete if 
products are not continuously tested and the results made generally 
available. Business firms would not think of buying goods without 
previously ascertaining their quality and fitness for the intended pur-
pose. Firms establish elaborate testing operations or secure such 
information from independent organizations; the Government fol-
lows the same procedure. The Department of Defense (which sets 
the standards for most goods bought throughout the Government) 
and the, General Services Administration, using their own resources 
and those of the National Bureau of Standards, gather the facts nec-
essary to intelligent choice.86 In contrast, the consumer is left largely 
on his own; he is denied even the information which his own Gov-
ernment has collected in its testing. 87 
Although the two principal nonprofit testing organizations, Con-
either ban or inhibit advertising, just as the British government has decided to forbid 
cigarette advertising on television. See 111 CONG. R.Ec. 2285-86 (Feb. 9, 1965). 
84. The power to issue binding regulations is absolutely essential. If enforcement 
agencies are required to proceed on a case-by-case basi&-as is now generally true-
they will not be able to deal effectively with the dynamics of the marketplace. For a 
review of the inadequacies of existing legislation, see statement by Senator Hart, in 
Hearings on Fair Packaging and Labeling Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 722-25 (1965). 
85. See text accompanying notes 92-94 infra. 
86. Most specifications for products purchased by the federal government are es-
tablished by the Department of Defense pursuant to the Defense Standardization 
Program, on the theory that it is the biggest user of goods within the Government. 
The Department's principal objective has been the correlation of product quality with 
physical and chemical characteristics, which is the type of information that would be 
· of interest to the consumer-taxpayer. The General Services Administration also is 
active in the testing and evaluation of diverse products. For a discussion of the 
Government's activities as a purchaser, see H.R. REP. No. 1241, op. cit. supra note 
79, at 152. 
87. For a critical discussion of this subject, see Big Secret: Federal Government's 
Consumer Reports Service, The New Republic, May 22, 1965, p. 7. 
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sumers Union and Consumers Research, provide much helpful in-
formation in their monthly publications, their resources are limited, 
and they are not able to test as extensively as conditions demand.88 
Furthermore, the fact that both organizations derive most of their 
revenue from subscriptions to their publications means that their 
effective audience is . sharply limited in size-seldom reaching the 
poor, who may need _assistance more than anyone else.80 
Both Consumers Union and Consumers Research forbid any 
commercial use of their test findings or comments.00 While this 
policy may make sense from their point .of view (it is thought to en-
sure integrity of their findings), it severely restricts the dissemina-
tion of the best existing information about the comparative value 
of competing products. 
If there is to be a broader testing program and greater circula-
tion of test results, the federal government must actively enter the 
picture. The Government should promptly make available the re• 
sults of the tests it has itself performed.91 In addition, it should es-
tablish a major testing agency to test extensively and make available 
its findings systematically, doing so, of course, in the most objective 
manner possible. The procedures developed by Consumers Union 
might serve as a useful guide. 
88. For its 1964 fiscal year, Consumers Union reported income of $4.2 million. 
Of this amount only about $700,000 was spent by the Technical Department, which 
carries out its testing program. Consumer Reports, Nov. 1965, p. 569. The technical 
director of Consumers Union has implicitly acknowledged that more work should be 
done in many product categories, including automobiles, foods (where many newer 
products have not been tested), textiles (adequate testing often requires mass panels 
of users), and assorted home products. Letter to Author From Colston E. Warne, 
CU President, Feb. 1, 1966, enclosing a memorandum from the organization's technical 
director. 
89. Indigents have numerous problems, of course, and the provision of more knowl• 
edge about consumer products would be only one element in a program of meaningful 
aid-but an important one. At present "most poor people do not possess the necessary 
knowledge, skill, and time to get full value for their dollars." REPORT OF THE (U.S.) 
PANEL ON CONSUMER EDUCATION FOR PERSONS WITH LIMITED INCOMES, at vi Qune 
1965). See generally CAl'Lovrrz, THE PooR PAY MoRE (1963). 
90. Each issue of Consumer Reports carries this warning: "Neither the ratings nor 
the reports may be used in advertising or for any commercial purpose of any nature. 
Consumers Union will take all steps open to it to prevent or to prosecute any such 
uses of its material or of its name or the name of Consumer Reports," In one instance 
the FTC, at Consumers Union's request, ordered a major appliance company to cease 
using advertising material which made reference to the results of certain Consumers 
Union tests. Consumer Reports, Sept. 1965, p. 425. 
91. A quasi-official group has recommended that an "interdepartment study group" 
be established by the Department of Commerce for the purpose of identifying and 
publicly disseminating governmental information which might be useful to consumers. 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE REGIONAL CONSUMER CONFERENCES 10-11 (March 
1965). The Conferences were sponsored by the Office of the Special Assistant for 
Consumer Affairs. · 
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A comprehensive program of the type outlined here-incorporat-
ing expanded labeling requirements, quality grading, and extensive 
product tests-would provide the consumer with the information 
needed to buy intelligently. However, if such a program were to be 
implemented forcefully and efficiently, it would require the direc-
tion of a new governmental agency. To divide the program into 
pieces and distribute them among a number · of existing govern-
mental units, along with the three hundred consumer-related activi-
ties now under the supervision of more than thirty separate depart-
ments and agencies, would blunt the effectiveness of the over-all 
effort by destroying the interdependence of its constituent elements. 
Furthermore, many of the agencies now concerned in greater or 
lesser degree with consumers deal principally in the negative aspects 
of trade practices, such as the enforcement of prohibitions on busi-
ness behavior that is viewed as detrimental to the public interest. 
This negative function is true of both the FDA.and the FTC; typi-
cally they confront a· situation only when its deleterious effect has 
been or is about to be felt. 
By contrast, a meaningful consumer program of the kind sketched 
here, which is oriented to the distribution of knowledge, requires 
an affirmative posture designed to equip the consumer with the in-
formation he requires to buy wisely, rather than the services of a 
policeman. It is doubtful that either the FTC or the FDA could 
adapt to the required approach with the necessary speed or spirit. 
A new agency, charged with responsibility for carrying out 'the pro-
gram described, appears to be the best answer. Its exact location 
within the Government and its precise name are comparatively 
minor matters. Nevertheless, such an agency could be designated as 
the Consumers Protection Service, and it could be placed in the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare.92 
92. The agency's title is considerably less important than the fact that the agency 
must be a permanent unit of the government empowered by law to perform certain 
specific functions. In the past, recommendations and state legislation for the establish• 
mcnt of an Office of Consumers (see note 46 supra and accompanying text) have been 
vague as to the exact duties it was to carry out. For example, the 1959 California law 
establishing a Consumer Counsel merely stated iliat the Counsel will "advise the 
Governor as to all matters affecting the interests of the people as consumers" and 
"recommend" such legislation as is deemed necessary to "protect and promote" the 
interests of consumers. In the absence of more specific statutory responsibilities, it is 
doubtful that a Consumer Counsel can play an effective role in aiding the consumer. 
The Counsel can, however, contract for surveys, economic information, and such 
similar services as may be "necessary and proper." CAL. CODE §§ 12050-57. Other states 
have formed similar offices. Washington did so after its Consumer Advisory Council 
concluded in 1960 that " 'caveat emptor' as the maxim of the market place is no 
longer realistically applicable in an economic society of electronic and mechanical 
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Upon the creation of a Consumers Protection Service, an effort 
could be made over a period of time to transfer to it many of the 
consumer-related activities now found throughout the Government. 
A complete centralization of consumer affairs in the new agency 
would be neither possible nor desirable, but a large number of such 
activities could be transferred without impairing the ability of the 
departments in which they are now found to carry out their missions. 
After the formation of the Service, the existing office of the Special 
Assistant for Consumer Affairs could be abolished, and the Con-
sumer Advisory Council, now an accessory to the Executive Office 
of the President, made an adjunct of the new agency. The Com-
mittee on Consumer Interests would be preserved for purposes of 
interagency coordination, with the head of the Service serving as its 
chairman. 
In addition to implementing the specific programs mentioned 
here, the new Service would have to assume a general role in aiding 
the consumer. Among other functions, this responsibility would call 
for the support of research directly related to consumer affairs. At 
the present time, the federal government spends more than fifteen 
billion dollars per year for research and development, but it devotes 
practically nothing to consumers' problems, despite the fact that 
consumers are the largest single component of the nation's economic 
activity. 
Much careful study is also needed if the Government, acting on 
behalf of the consumer, is to be in a position to deal with new prod-
ucts and with novel sales devices that are certain to be used in the 
future. Behavioral scientists have already demonstrated their ability 
to invent highly sophisticated-some would say fiendish-techniques 
to influence buyers subconsciously (subliminal advertising is only 
one example of what is to come).93 The Government must be aware 
complexes, chemical formulas, packaged meals, and an infinite variety of financing 
devices and interest variations." State Government News, Oct. 1965. The British 
Committee on Consumer Protection was instrumental in the establishment of a 
Consumer Council. See REPORT, op. cit. supra note 77, at 314-15. The Council was 
admonished "to inform itself fully about the consumer's probJems." 
93. Noting that behavioral research may be employed to "capitalize on human 
weaknesses" of consumers, one author has concluded that "the ability to influence 
consumption via behavioral analyses is potentially too dangerous to remain unchecked, 
If intimate knowledge about human behavior is used to exploit consumers and con-
tributes to greater concentration of economic power, some means of insuring market 
freedom becomes necessary. Prophylactic rather than therapeutic control ••• may be 
needed." Peterson, A Critique of Interdisciplinary Analysis of Marl,ets, 6 BUSINESS &: 
SOCIETY 25, 31-32 (1965). For a discussion of psychological techniques used in the sale 
of consumer goods, see DICHTER, CONSUMER MOTIVATIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE 
WORLD OF OBJECTS (1964); PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957), 
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of the developments in the area of new products and adver-
tising techniques, so that it can devise appropriate responses before 
the associated problems assume serious proportions. Likewise, the 
increasing international sale of consumer products means that gov-
ernments must begin to work together more closely to develop com-
patible regulatory and promotional programs. 94 Also needed is a 
stepped-up, broader-based effort to make the nation's consumers, 
especially the poor, more fully aware of the realities of the market-
place and of the information they can use in making their purchases. 
In carrying out all of these activities, the new Consumer Protec-
tion Service could do a great deal on its own, but it is perfectly ap-
parent that the Government must also encourage the growth of pri-
vate research organizations. For example, the membership fee in 
Consumers Union or other similar nonprofit organizations could be 
made a deductible item for the individual taxpayer in the same 
manner that a business can deduct "ordinary and necessary" ex-
penses. In dealing with consumer problems, there is abundant 
opportunity for both private activity and a large increase in govern-
mental participation. 
Assuming that the proposed program and administrative or-
ganization set forth here would provide considerable aid for the 
consumer and contribute to a more efficient economy, neverthe-
less a determination must be made with regard to whether these 
ideas are politically salable. Unfortunately, in answering that ques-
tion, one cannot be particularly optimistic. Any program that 
might help the consumer buy more intelligently conflicts sharply 
with one or more producer interests. As noted earlier, producers are 
typically well organized, heavily financed, capably staffed, and pre-
pared to defend the status quo aggressively. Throughout this cen-
tury, manufacturers have resisted almost every effort to protect the 
consumer. Passage of the Food and Drug Act of 1906 was delayed 
for more than ten years due to the opposition of the Proprietary As-
sociation of America. In fact, pressure from an emotionally aroused 
public was eventually required for its enactment. A similar situation 
existed in the 1930's; only the deaths of almost one hundred persons 
who had consumed elixir sulfanilamide created the climate in which 
94. Some limited efforts at international cooperation are under way. For instance, 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, established in 1962 under the auspices of the 
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Health Organiza-
tion and composed of representatives from forty-five countries, is attempting to develop 
uniform foods standards. For a description of the Commission's activities, see Wall 
Street Journal, Oct. 6, 1965, p. 16, cols. 4-5. 
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amendments to the 1906 act could be enacted. Once more, in 1962,· 
the thalidomide scandal provided the spark that provoked additional 
protective drug legislation; even then, the original proposals were 
watered down considerably before enactment. 05 
& Senator Hart has pointed out, any legislative proposal that 
deals with labeling, packaging, or other aspects of modern merchan-
dising attracts critics just as flypaper attracts insects.00 The big com-
panies (with their vast stake in trade-name merchandising), the ma-
jor advertising agencies, and the mass media, which are financed 
primarily by advertising, quickly line up in opposition.97 Proponents 
of reform are obligated to fight continuously and are allowed to 
make no gains without the bitterest opposition. Under these condi-
tions even the most zealous reformers are usually rebuffed.98 
The only way that the producer interests can be subdued and 
substantial reform achieved is by confronting their large and well-
95. The story of the 1962 drug amendments legislation is told in a brilliant fashion 
in HAruus, THE REAL VOICE 154, 181-93 (1964). Harris also comments on the back-
ground to the 1938 drug act. Id. at 181-83. 
96. See Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers' Economic Interests Be 
Enacted?, 64 MICH, L. R.Ev. 1255 (1966). 
97. Major advertisers generally make it clear to the media that they expect full 
support, right down to the suppression of news and opinion that they view as hostile 
to their economic interests. Most of the media cooperate fully. See A Story for Our 
Times, Consumer Reports, March 1965, p. 118. Commercial support of educational 
television threatens to close that medium as an objective source of news and comment, 
even though the benefactors insist they make their contributions without strings. 
Jack Gould, TV editor of the New York Times, has commented realistically that "the 
man· who spends the dollar wants to have something to say about how it is spent, 
and the door of educational TV might [therefore] be opened to the very commercial 
pressures which the medium is designed to resist," N.Y. Times, Jan, 16, 1966, § 2, 
p. 19, cols. 1-5 (city ed.). 
98. The recent battle over a cigarette cancer warning is a good example. When a 
link between cigarette consumption and cancer was reported by the Public Health 
Service, various proposals were made to deal with the problem. Some people urged 
an outright ban on the sale of cigarettes; others urged an end to cigarette advertising 
(see note 83 supra); still others insisted that all cigarette advertisements should carry 
a warning about the risk of cancer. When the battle was ended, and the hordes of 
lobbyists had departed, all that remained was a requirement that cigarette packages 
(but not advertisements) carry the following warning: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking 
May Be Hazardous to Your Health." The cigarette companies and the advertising 
media had clearly won. For a review of the encounter, see Consumer Reports, Oct, 
1965, p. 488. The story was much the same with respect to the 1962 drug amendments 
legislation. HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 95, at 154, 181-93. Similarly, because of intense 
opposition, and in spite of formal presidential support, the so-called Truth-in• 
Lending Bill (S. 2275, 89th Cong. (1965)) has been blocked. This bill, which was offered 
by Senator Douglas, would require that anyone who lends money or extends credit 
must supply the borrower or credit user with a statement of the total finance charge 
in dollars and cents and a statement of the finance charge e.xpressed in terms of a 
true annual rate on the outstanding unpaid balance of the obligation. These two 
requirements would enable the consumer to compare the cost of credit from various 
sources. For a more detailed explanation of the bill, see 111 CONG. REc. 15848-55, 
(daily ed. July 12, 1965). 
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equipped forces with an equally powerful opposition. A president 
like Theodore Roosevelt (who provided active support for the orig-
inal Food and Drug Act and for the Meat Inspection Act of 1907)" 
can make an excellent general in charge of the forces of reform. 
However, most presidents prefer not to run to the center of the battle 
until they determine whether they have an army, and this is another 
major reason why the consumer has been so unsuccessful in securing 
government aid. Unlike the farmer, the laborer, and the business-
man, the consumer has never been effectively organized; in the ab-
sence of organization, political response is slow to come, if it comes 
at all. 
While the lack of organization among consumers is a serious hand-
icap, nevertheless it can be overcome if political leaders are willing 
to take the initiative in advocating programs to aid the consumer. 
The politician's dream, of course, is to rush to the head of a line 
that has already formed, but in the past there have been many social 
reformers who initially assumed an exposed position and then built 
their support. Senator Hart's introduction of truth-in-packaging leg-
islation in 1961 has had precisely this effect. He has received several 
thousand letters urging passage of his bill, and the publishers of 
Consumer Reports feel there is more public interest in truth-in-
packaging than any other consumer issue in the thirty-year history of 
their publication. The debate has been accentuated by the outspoken 
opposition of manufacturers and their supporters, which has served to 
intensify consumer acclaim for the bill. This increasing public sup-
port is a good example of the way in which efforts to defeat legisla-
tion can have the opposite effect of that intended.99 Moreover, with 
the mobilization of public opinion behind truth-in-packaging legis-
lation, additional political voices have been raised in aid of the con-
sumer. Finally, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson added their en-
dorsements to this consumer legislation. 
Just as the lack of organization does not necessarily preclude 
legislation designed to aid consumers, there is also precedent for the 
Government to create an agency to help represent consumers' inter-
ests. Labor and agriculture provide two examples; in both cases Con-
gress set up a special agency to deal with problems before the mem-
bers of these groups had formed powerful organizations of their own. 
A Department of Agriculture was formed in 1862,100_ but effective 
99. See Hart, supra note 96, at 1267-68. 
100. 12 Stat. 387 (1862). The Department of Agriculture was administered by a 
Commissioner of Agriculture until 1889. In that year the Department's powers and 
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organization of the nation's farmers did not come until the 1870's 
with the spread of the Granger movement. Similarly, a Bureau of 
Labor was created in 1884,101 which was well before the Knights of 
Labor reached their peak of power and many years prior to the rise 
of the American Federation of Labor. 
In spite of the difficulties, therefore, it should be politically fea-
sible to establish a special consumer agency in the federal govern-
ment and to adopt and execute a program of the kind outlined 
here-provided that there is continued support by political spokes-
men who have so far taken an active interest in the problem. How-
ever, one cannot assume that these spokesmen will necessarily con-
tinue to be active in the future. As previously noted, there has been 
a marked tendency in the past to be content with the eradication 
of a few symptoms of the consumer problem without seeking a com-
prehensive, systematic solution. Even if a Truth-in-Packaging bill is 
enacted into law this year, much more must be done if the consumer 
is to be placed in a position where he can buy wisely and deal effec-
tively with the realities of the contemporary marketplace. 
This article, which may have helped place the consumer prob-
lem in its larger economic and political perspective, has suggested 
the ingredients of a program of governmental action that would 
satisfy consumers' needs. The precise details of these proposals are 
relatively unimportant, but it is essential to appreciate the problems 
they are designed to meet and to recognize that the job of putting 
the consumer in a position to purchase intelligently has only begun. 
These considerations have not been adequately recognized before, 
and, of course, it is an open question whether they will be now. If 
they are not, the consumer will continue to occupy a "back seat" 
in the formulation of the Government's economic policy.102 
duties were enlarged, and it was made the eighth executive department in the 
federal government, with the Commissioner becoming the Secretary of Agriculture. 
25 Stat. 659 (1889), 5 U.S.C. § 512 (1964). 
101. Originally the Bureau of Labor was under the Interior Department. Later 
the Bureau became independent as a Department of Labor without executive status. 
In 1903 it reverted to bureau status under the Department of Commerce and Labor 
(32 Stat. 827 (1903)). Finally, in 1913, it attained separate standing as an executive 
department. 37 Stat. 736 (1913), 5 U.S.C. § 611 (1964). 
102. The characterization is that of President Johnson. See note 41 supra. 
